Volume 16
Issue 2 Symposium on Environmental Impact Statements
Spring 1976

Administrative Agency Implementation of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969: A Conceptual Framework for
Explaining Differential Response
Allan F. Wichelman

Recommended Citation
Allan F. Wichelman, Administrative Agency Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969: A Conceptual Framework for Explaining Differential Response, 16 Nat. Resources J. 263 (1976).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol16/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT OF 1969: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
FOR EXPLAINING DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE
ALLAN F. WICHELMAN*
INTRODUCTION

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)' combines a statement of national environmental policy2 with a set of
procedural duties designed to assure the implementation of that

policy throughout the federal government. 3 The Act directs federal
agencies to interpret and administer "to the fullest possible extent"
their policies and regulations in accordance with its policy state-

ment,' making environmental protection part of the mandate of
each federal agency. NEPA also instructs the agencies to use systematic, interdisciplinary methodologies in environmental impact
studies,' and to improve the techniques through which they take
into account environmental values in their planning and decision-

making activities.6
Except for the procedural duties specified in Section 102, the Act
provides no precise guidance for agency implementation and compliance, nor does it delegate responsibility for developing such guidance to any administrative body.7 The Act's scant legislative history
suggests that its drafters assumed that it would be largely self-implementing.8 The statute simply directs each agency to develop its own
*Instructor, Department of Political Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Jon Bond, Richard Liroff, Stuart Nagel,
and Richard Tobin for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. The field
research was supported, in part, by grants from the Granite City Steel Corporation and the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. However, the opinions and conclusions contained in this paper are solely those of the author.
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970) (hereinafter NEPAl.
2. Id. § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
3. Id. § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
4. Id. § 102(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1).
5. Id. § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A).
6. Id. § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B).
7. Dreyfus and Ingram, The National Environmental Policy Act: A View of Intent and
Practice, 16 Nat. Res. J. 243 (1976) cite the Act's conference report as evidence that
implementation guidance would be provided through extensive rule-making. They also note
that an interpretive role was envisioned for the federal courts.
8. Dreyfus & Ingram, Id., discuss the difficulty of determining the intentions of the
legislators who participated in the formulation of NEPA. However, the use of the term
"action-forcing" to describe the Act's environmental impact statements (EIS) requirement
supports the view that at the very least, the Act's proponents expected it to catalyze
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methods and procedures for integrating environmental values into
agency decisionmaking, and to review their organic statutes for
inconsistencies with NEPA's environmental policy. 9 The Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ), established by NEPA, only assists the
agencies in carrying out the Act.' 0
Some of NEPA's proponents anticipated that the Act's mandatory
procedural reforms would be sufficient to bring environmental concerns within the scope of agency consciousness. By requiring greater
scrutiny and full public disclosure of the impacts of agency actions,
the Act's supporters argued, it would assure informed consideration
of previously neglected environmental values in agency decisionmaking. NEPA's critics were quick to assert that the Act might assure
detailed disclosure of the environmental impacts of agency activities
yet leave essentially unaltered the processes by which agency decisions are made. As a consequence, they believed, NEPA's procedural
reforms would be inadequate to implement the Act's substantive
environmental policy.
Controversy over NEPA's actual and potential impact on agency
decisionmaking tends to gloss over the many political and practical
differences that characterize the array of federal agencies which comprise the administrative process. These agencies differ markedly in
power, purpose, and clientele.' 1 At the time of NEPA's enactment,
some agencies possessed technical expertise, staffing and monetary
resources requisite to implement the Act. Others evidenced little
experience in environmental management and lacked necessary
internal structures and procedures to implement the Act. Still others,
changes within the administrative process in and of itself. See generally Hearings on S. 1075,
S. 237 & S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969) and Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). These and other
relevant documents are discussed and supplemented by interview data in R. Andrews,
Environmental Policy and Administrative Change: The National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (1970-71), (Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of City and Regional Planning, U. of N.C.
1972), and T. Finn, Conflict and Compromise: Congress Makes a Law, The Passage of the
National Environmental Policy Act (Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Gov., Georgetown U.

1972).
9. NEPA § § 102(2)(B), 103, 42 U.S.C. § § 4332(2)(B), 4333 (1970).
10. Id. § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B).
11. Organizational differentiation across the administrative process is considered in J.
Davis, Jr., An Introduction to Public Administration: Politics, Policy, and Bureaucracy
(1974) and 1. Sharkansky, Public Administration: Policy-Making in Government Agencies
(1970). More specialized analyses are presented in L. Salamon & G. Wamsley, The Federal

Bureaucracy-Responsive to Whom? (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the Midwest Pol. Sci. Ass'n., Chicago, Ili., May 1-3, 1975) and J. Hartmann, Representative

Bureaucracy: Variations in Specialization and Hierarchy in Sixty Federal Agencies (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n., San Francisco,
Cal., Sept. 2-5, 1975).
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while technically competent to implement NEPA, found it politically
inexpedient to do so enthusiastically. Now, six years after NEPA's
enactment, scholarly commentary is just beginning to refine our
understanding of the importance of agency differences in explaining
the Act's differential implementation across the administrative
process.' 2 In response to this research need, this paper presents the
results of exploratory research that was designed to identify factors
relevant to understanding how and why administrative agency
response has varied.' '
The research includes data obtained from interviews conducted
during the summer of 1974 with more than thirty NEPA liaisons"' '
and a variety of other knowledgeable informants involved in the
implementation of NEPA. Table 1 identifies the agencies included in
the study and classifies them into three types according to the extent
of their involvement in environmental management activities prior to
enactment of NEPA. 1 I The interview schedule employed in studying
these agencies was designed to identify internal agency characteristics
and external forces associated with different rates and kinds of
implementation activity.' 6
From the results of the research, a multi-phased conceptual framework was developed. The framework identifies four general phases of
implementation activity observed during the first four and one-half
years of the Act's operation and isolates the principal intervening
variables associated with movement by an agency from one phase to
another. The phases tend to occur as a progression, beginning with an
"Interpretive Phase" in which agency leadership first recognizes the
existence of the Act's requirements and implications. This phase
tends to be followed by a "Formal Compliance Phase" in which
12. For a critical evlauation of the research to date on NEPA, see Wandesforde-Smith,
Schwartz & Johnston, Policy Impact Analysis and Environmental Management: Review and

Comment, 3 Policy Studies J. (1975).
13. A complete report of the author's research is contained in his doctoral dissertation,
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: A Study of the Politics of Policy Implementation (U. of Ill., forthcoming).
14. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has requested each agency involved in
NEPA's implementation to designate a "NEPA liaison." This person then becomes responsible for maintaining an overview of his agency's implementation activities so as to enable
him to receive and process any inquiries concerning these activities. Lists of NEPA liaisons
are regularly published in the 102 Monitor.
15. The rationale underlying the classification scheme and the materials used to position
each agency are presented in A. Wichelman, The National Environmental Policy Act of
1969: A Study of the Politics of Policy Implementation (Ph.D. dissertation, U. of Ill.,
forthcoming).
16. See Wichelman, id. See also the comments of Wandesforde-Smith et al., supra note

12, noting the need to take into account the "interdependency among the agencies, courts,
and interest groups ... in explaining the impact of NEPA on environmental decisionmak-

ing."
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TABLE 1
A Classification of Selected Administrative Agencies
By Extent of Their Pre-NEPA Involvement in Environmental Management
Type I Agencies
Agencies whose pre-NEPA
responsibilities required
substantial activity designed
to protect or improve
environmental quality

Examples Studied*
Department of Interior (DOI)
Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR)
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation
(BSF)
National Park Service (NPS)
Department of Agriculture (DOA)
Forest Service (AFS)
Department of Transportation (DOT)
Coast Guard (CGD)
Water Resources Council (WRC)

Type 1 Agencies
Agencies whose pre-NEPA
responsibilities generally
did not require substantial
environmentally protective
activity, but whose activities
were constrained by
environmental legislation

Examples Studied
Department of Interior
Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
Bureau of Reclamation (IBR)
Department of Agriculture
Rural Electrification Administration (REA)
Soil Conservation Service (SCS)
Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Federal Highway Administration (FHW)
Department of Defense (DOD)
Army Corps of Engineers (COE)
Various other military agencies**
Department of Commerce (DOC)
Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD)
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
National Science Foundation (NSF)

Type IIIAgencies
Agencies whose pre-NEPA
responsibilities seldom
were considered to have
any environmental
significance

Examples Studied
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)***
Department of Justice (JUS)
Department of the Treasury (TRE)
Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
General Services Administration (GSA)
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
Veterans Administration (VAD)

*The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), established on December 2, 1970, was
also included in the study.
**The military agencies studied were the Army (USA) and Navy (USN).
***Excluding the Public Health Service.
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implementation activity focuses on putting the procedural and structural adaptations required to comply formally with the Act into
effect. A third or "Integrated Planning Phase" tends to follow, in
which formal implementation activities are slowly integrated into
ongoing agency decisionmaking procedures.1 7 A final or "Programmatic Planning Phase" tends to complete the implementation
process. During this phase, environmental values are integrated into
the formulation of proposed agency legislation, programs, policies
and regulations.' 8
The reader is cautioned that the activities which define the four
phases of implementation are not mutually exclusive. They simply
provide a convenient notation with which to discuss measurable
shifts in the rates and kinds of implementation activity that characterize an agency or group of agencies at a given point in time.
Although the research indicates that the phases tend to occur as a
progression, whether any given agency moves from one phase to
another is dependent on a variety of exogenous and intervening
variables. Movement from one phase to another is not inevitable, nor
is the possibility of retrogression ruled out.
THE INTERPRETATIVE PHASE
NEPA was signed into law by President Nixon on January 1, 1970.
Although the White House had not supported the legislation in
Congress," the President used the opportunity to proclaim the
1970's as the decade in which "America [would pay] its debts to the
past by reclaiming the purity of its air, its waters and our living
environment." 2 0 Despite the President's endorsement, most administrative agencies initially exhibited a more reserved attitude toward
the new legislation. This time period, during which the agencies first
develop an awareness of NEPA, will be referred to as the "Interpretive Phase" of implementation.
17. This paper follows the distinction between "decisions" and "decisionmaking" and
"policies" and "policymaking" presented in J. Anderson, Public Policymaking 3, 10 (1975).
Therein "policy" is defined as "a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of
actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern." Policymaking "typically involves a
pattern of action, extending over time and involving many decisions, some routine and some
not so routine. Rarely will a policy be synonymous with a single decision." (Emphasis
added.)
18. For similar attempts to delineate general patterns of NEPA implementation, see C.
Ash, Three Year Evolution, 5 Water Spectrum 28-35 (1973), and Council in Environmental
Quality, Environmental Quality-1974: The Fifth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality 372-74 (1974).
19. T. Finn, supra note 8, at 432.
20. Statement by the President of the United States, Office of the White House Press
Secretary, January 1, 1970.
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Harrell Rodgers has posited four conditions with which to predict
the degree of congruence between the content of a statute and the
consequences it actually engenders:
1) The extent to which the regulated agree both that a legal standard has been established by a legitimate source and that the
standard requires compliance;
2) The extent to which the law clearly and carefully defines both
who is responsible for seeing that it is obeyed and the type and
amount of compliance required;
3) The extent to which the regulated perceive that certain and
severe sanctions will result from noncompliance; and
4) The extent to which those who are to receive the benefits of the
law are cohesive and take strong actions to achieve their rights. 2 1
When most agencies entered the Interpretive Phase shortly after
NEPA's enactment,2 2 none of these conditions were fully met.
Although the agencies did not question the legitimacy of Congressional authority to make law, they did adopt a wait-and-see attitude
toward whether Congress would require strict compliance with the
Act. In so doing, the agencies tended to prefer discussions of NEPA's
possible import to actions implementing the Act." This tendency
was supported by uncertainty about who would oversee the Act's
implementation, whether interest group litigation demanding implementation would ensue, and what internal agency changes would be
required to comply with NEPA's procedural reforms. Initially, therefore, agency implementation exhibits the general disposition to resist
change frequently attributed to administrative agencies. 2"
Four important sources of resistance to implementation during the
Interpretive Phase can be identified. These include actions by agency
leadership, the characteristics of agency staff, the composition of
agency clientele, and agency procedures and structures for routine
decisionmaking.? The strength of these sources of resistance, com21. Law as an Instrument of Public Policy, 17 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 646 (1973).
22. A few agencies entered the Interpretive Phase later. These were agencies that were
given responsibility for environmental management activities after NEPA's enactment. The
Environmental Protection Agency, for example, was not established until December of
1970, nearly a year after the passage of NEPA.
23. C. Ash, supra note 18; Kreith, Lack of Impact, 15 Environment 26-33 (JanuaryFebruary 1973); A. Wichelman, supra note 15.
24. C. Lindblom, Incrementalism and Environmentalism, in Managing the Environment
83-84 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ed. 1973); L. Caldwel, Environmental
Quality as an Administrative Problem, 900 The Annals of the Am. Academy of Pol. and
Social Sci. 103-15 (1972); L. Jaffe, Commentary: The Administrative Agency and Environmental Control, 20 Buffalo L. Rev. 231-37 (1970); and, see generally, A. Downs, Inside
Bureaucracy (1966); and H. Kaufman, The Limits of Organizational Change (1971).
25. These categories roughly follow those utilized by L. Salamon & G. Wamsley, supra
note 11; and H. Kaufman, id.
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bined with the degree of uncertainty that prevails about the implementation conditions posited by Rodgers, is especially important in
determining whether and when an agency moves from the interpretation of NEPA to its implementation.
The actions of agency leadership are especially significant during
the Interpretive Phase. In the absence of detailed implementation
standards and procedures, court decisions, and other forms of administrative oversight, agency leaders provide agency staff with their
only source of authoritative guidance on implementation. Agency
leaders are also the ultimate source of staff rewards, patronage and
promotions. Thus, the views they espouse set the parameters for the
"6proper" amount of staff implementation activity.2 6 The respondents seldom reported changes in their respective agencies' capabilities for environmental analysis in the absence of a clear mandate
from agency leadership for such changes.2 7
Type I agencies, for example, tend to be among the slowest to
move through the Interpretive Phase despite their greater experience
in environmental management. When asked to explain their dilatory
implementation during the Interpretive Phase, agencies such as the
National Park Service, the Forest Service, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries, and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation reported that their
leadership initially believed that NEPA did not apply to their activities. Staff within the agencies, accordingly, concluded that they
were in effect exempt from the Act. 28 A comment by an official of
the National Park Service is representative of the responses elicited
from most Type I agency personnel when they were asked why their
initial implementation activities had been slow in developing:
The Park Service ... felt [it was] on the side of the environment.
People in the Service ... felt that they were doing good. ... We
really felt for the first year or eighteen months that we weren't
subject to NEPA, so we messed around, didn't do environmental
statements, and gave [NEPAJ lip service. 2 9
A more extreme version of this justification was offered by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) when environmentalists
26. Agency patterns of staff recruitment and socialization, in turn, reinforce this
tendency. See, e.g., L. Salamon & G. Wamsley, id. at 30-32, and H. Seidman, Politics,
Position and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization ch. 4 (1970).
27. More complete documentation of deference to leadership is contained in A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5. Exceptions include agencies such as the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, the Forest Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
Each of these agencies reported significant implementation initiatives by their field staff
that exceeded those required by agency leadership.
28. Id
29. Confidential interview with National Park Service official, May 22, 1974.
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criticized it for refusing to prepare environmental impact statements
(EIS's) on its regulatory activities. EPA contended that since NEPA's
procedural requirements might have a harmful substantive impact on
its regulatory activities under various standard setting statutes, they
did not apply to these EPA activities.' 0
Type II agency administrators were less likely to find the Act
applicable to their activities. During the Interpretive Phase, these
agencies engaged in lengthy and often unproductive debates over
which of their activities came within the ambit of NEPA.3 1 In the
absence of implementation oversight from external sources, Type II
agencies tended narrowly to construe what constitutes a "major"
federal action, what a "significant adverse effect" is, and what the
contents of an EIS should be.3 2 Discussions about implementation
by Type III agencies were even more abstruse.3 3
In the absence of strong endorsement of NEPA implementation by
agency leadership, it is not surprising that significant staff opposition
to the Act's implementation can be documented during the Interpretive Phase in all three agency types. Agency staff, who are recruited
and socialized in accordance with agency norms and customs, tend to
prefer the certainty of existing arrangements to the uncertainty of
procedural and structural reform. The few changes reported during
the Interpretive Phase were limited to the reassignment of small numbers of staff to tasks such as EIS preparation or study of how the Act
might be implemented at some later point in time. The definition of
new lines of authority and responsibility for NEPA implementation
that occurs during the Formal Compliance Phase is not yet operative.
Staff criticism of NEPA as an impediment to key programs and
disruptive of routine agency business goes virtually unchallenged.
The Act's immediate costs and the threat it poses to existing arrange-

30. Insightful discussions of EPA's paradoxical attitude toward NEPA are offered in F.
Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in Federal Environmental Law 256-67;
(E. Doig and T. Guilbert ed. 1974); B. Neuman, Implementation of the Clean Air Act:
Should NEPA Apply to the Environmental Protection Agency?, 3 Ecology L. Q. 597-638
(1973); and Muskie & Cutler, A National Environmental Policy: Now You See It, Now You
Don't, 25 Maine L. Rev. 163-193 (1973). In 1974 EPA agreed voluntarily to prepare EIS's
on a variety of regulatory actions. 39 Fed. Reg. 16186 (May 7, 1974).
31. Ambiguities in NEPA's statutory language are discussed in R. Liroff, NEPA and its
Aftermath: The Formation of a National Policy for the Environment ch. 4 (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern U., forthcoming).
32. The Council on Environmental Quality, for example, notes that at first "most agencies adopted the position that NEPA did not apply to them at all-at least not to most of
their programs.. ." CEQ, supra note 18, at 372.
33. Confidential interview with Department of Health, Education and Welfare official,
May 17, 1974, discussed in A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.
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ments dominate staff discussions, while the possible long-range
benefits of the Act are largely overlooked.' 4
Agency clientele3 I present a third source of implementation resistance during the Interpretive Phase. Concerned primarily with
furthering their particular special interests, most clientele groups
prefer to ignore or oppose implementation of the Act. These groups
quickly recognize that in many instances implementation costs will
devolve upon them and that vigorous implementation may weaken
their positions within the policy subsystems of their respective client
agencies. 3 6 Agencies are quick to take into account the attitudes of
their clientele toward implementation. Without the support of their
clientele, the agencies face increased organizational instability that
may even jeopardize their survival. Lester Salamon and Gary
Wamsley offer this characterization of the relationship between an
agency and its clientele:
Those who ... can insure agency survival or threaten it ...have a

first call on agency behavior; and [an] agency's "responsiveness"
boils down to a concerted effort to define and carry out its task in a
way that will stabilize and institutionalize supportive relationships
with these "relevant others." 3 7
NEPA, of course, was designed to reform agency-clientele relationships by forcing agencies to add environmental considerations to
those criteria against which they traditionally tested their actions and
to admit into their policy subsystems environmental interest groups
that had been excluded in the past. It is not surprising, therefore, to
find most Type II and Type III agencies reporting that their initial
implementation efforts were constrained by reluctant cooperation
from their clientele.
Type II agencies especially emphasized that in planning when and
in what ways they would implement NEPA, they had to take into
account both the views of key legislators in their substantive and
34. Agencies, such as the Federal Highway Administration, that administer major federal
programs, tended to emphasize their initial concern that NEPA might suddenly bring these
programs to a halt. An FHW official commented, for example, that he thought the "Federal
Highway Administration's biggest problem in implementing NEPA [was) how to work it
into the highway program without bringing [the program) to a complete halt." Confidential
interview with Federal Highway Administration official, May 20, 1974.
35. The term "clientele" is used here to include those "groups that regard themselves or
that are regarded by an agency as benefiting from its work." F. Rourke, Bureaucracy,
Politics, and Public Policy 11 (1969). A more encompassing use of the term is employed in
Holden, Imperialism in Bureaucracy, 60 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 943-51 (1966).
36. An agency's "policy subsystem" links the agency to its clientele in a semi-stable,
symbiotic state of equilibrium. Implementation of NEPA threatens to disturb this equilib-

rium.
37. L. Salaman & G. Wamsley, supra note 11, at 6.
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appropriations committees and the demands of the interest groups
capable of influencing these committee members. The Atomic
Energy Commission (now two agencies, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration), for example, limited its independent environmental impact
analysis during the Interpretive Phase to the area of radiology rather
than require its construction permit applicants to submit detailed
technical information on other environmental considerations.3 The
Federal Power Commission delegated to its clientele (license applicants and intervenors) responsibility for compliance with NEPA.3 9
These implementation decisions were attributed by the interview
respondents, at least in part, to the power of clientele groups in
Congress favorable to energy development, with which both agencies
must contend. 4 0 Subsequently both agencies have taken greater
initiative in NEPA implementation. But during the Interpretive Phase
they preferred to see what consequences would ensue from implementation activities congenial to their clientele. Generally the greater
the perceived conflict between NEPA implementation activities and
an agency's pre-NEPA mandate, the more likely the agency was to go
slowly and cautiously in implementing the Act.
A fourth source of implementation resistance during the Interpretive Phase results from the "standard operating procedures" (SOP's)
that agencies use. SOP's are an agency's set organizational responses
to new circumstances.4 Organization theorists, such as Kaufman,
argue that SOP's are systemic sources of resistance to policy change:
Really to change what people do in large organizations thus turns
out to require much more than a single, simple, direct order; the full
extent and ramifications of the necessary changes become evident
runs afoul of long-established
only as each attempted innovation
42
prescriptionsand conventions.
38. This stance led to the first major circuit court interepretation of NEPA. See Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
39. This practice was struck down in Greene County Planning Bd. v. Fed. Power
Comm'n., 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
40. Confidential interviews with Atomic Energy Comm'n. official, May 30 and 31, 1974,
and Fed. Power Comm'n. official, May 3, 1974. See also the Congressional hearings concerned with NEPA's impact on the AEC's regulatory program: Hearings on H.R. 13752
Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries,Interim Nuclear Licensing, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91-18
(1972); Hearing Pursuant to S. Res 45, A National Fuels and Energy Policy Study, Parts 1
and 2, Calvert Cliffs' Court Decision, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-14 (1971); Hearings on
H.R. 13752 Before the Senate Comm on Interior and Insular Affairs, Interim Nuclear
Licensing, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
41. See, e.g., the discussion of SOP's in G. Allison, Essence of Decision 79 (1970).
42. H. Kaufman, supra note 24, at 31-32.
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NEPA, through the procedural reforms it introduced, provided the
"direct order" for agencies to reconceptualize their mandates to
include environmental values in their routine decisionmaking processes. It did not provide the organizational units or specialized
personnel needed to police compliance with that direct order. Moreover, NEPA offered no supplemental funding or grade period during
which these requisites for effective policy implementation could be,
developed. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that during the
Interpretive Phase political and organizational expediency take
precedence over NEPA's reform objectives, regardless of agency type.
The environmental impact analysis that is performed during the
Interpretive Phase tends to be delegated to whatever staff happens to
be available to do it, usually as a finishing touch to justify decisions
made earlier without consideration of environmental factors. 4 3 The
pooling of governmental expertise and citizen participation envisioned by the Act is not integrated into agency decisions during this
phase. Internal agency characteristics continue to thwart implementation until severe external, intervening factors combine to lessen
the resistance.
EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT AND AGENCY TRANSITION TO A
FORMAL COMPLIANCE PHASE
Environmentalists, who initially had been skeptical of NEPA's selfimplementation by the agencies, responded to the agencies' Interpretive Phase activities with litigation in the federal courts that sought
injunctions against proposed agency actions. Most of these suits
alleged noncompliance or inadequate compliance with NEPA procedures."4 Although NEPA contained no explicit provision for judicial oversight of its implementation, 4 5 the environmentalist-plaintiffs
were surprisingly successful in their initial efforts to involve the federal courts in such a role. 4 6 The court suits engendered by the Inter43. Discussions of early environmental review efforts are contained in J. Sullivan & P.
Montgomery, Highways and the Environment: How State and Federal Officials Assess the
Impact of Urban Highways (1972); G. Enk, Beyond NEPA: Criteria for Environmental
Impact Review (1973); and Kennedy & Hanshaw, The Effectiveness of Impact Statements:
The U.S. Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 243 Ekistics 19-22 (1974).
44. These cases are discussed in F. Anderson, NEPA in the Courts: A Legal Analysis of
the National Environmental Policy Act (1973).
45. Dreyfus & Ingram, supra note 7, however, assert that a definite role for judicial
oversight was anticipated by the Act's drafters.
46. A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 6, presents a statistical summary of NEPA litigation
from 1970 through April, 1973, which indicates that district court decisions favored the
environmentalist-plaintiffs in 44.5 percent of the cases litigated. See also the data on environmental cases generally that are presented in W. Grunbaum, Judicial Attitudes Toward
Environmental Quality in the Federal and State Courts (unpublished paper presented at the
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pretive Phase frequently resulted in court orders forcing agencies to
implement NEPA's procedural reforms and to give a broader construction to many of the Act's provisions. Frederick Anderson, a
leading commentator on judicial oversight of NEPA, has noted that
while the early judicial decisions construing the Act did not reflect a
departure by the judiciary from conventional standards for scrutiny
of agency decisionmaking, "the courts [did] become deeply involved
in NEPA's implementation, much more deeply involved than their
reliance upon the usual rhetoric of reviewing courts might imply." 4 7
The judicial review to which Anderson refers helped fulfill many
of the conditions Rodgers postulated as necessary for effective policy
implementation, but which had not been fulfilled by NEPA's statutory language. 4 8 Much of the uncertainty about the necessity for
elaborate procedural implementation of the Act was removed by the
court decisions. Moreover, they defined for the agencies the type and
amount of procedural implementation that would be required under
the Act. They also presented the agencies with severe sanctions for
noncompliance with the Act in the form of costly and time-consuming injunctions and adverse publicity.
Without judicial review, many of the Type II agencies indicated
that they would have undergone a less rapid transition from the
Interpretive to the Formal Compliance Phase of implementation. 4 9
The Type II agencies responsible for developmental activities, such as
the Army Corps of Engineers and the Federal Highway Administration, were the most frequent objects of Interpretive Phase litigation.
Thirty-six of the fifty NEPA suits decided during the first two years
of the Act's history involved various Type II agencies, whereas only
eight suits involved Type I agencies, and six, Type III agencies."
However, the interview data strongly support the proposition that
the effects of these suits quickly generalized to the less visible
agencies, which were not subjected to litigation. The offices of general counsel in these agencies monitored the emerging court decisions
and alerted agency leadership to the fact that any agency was vulnerable to NEPA suits. An attorney at the National Science Foundation
offered this observation:
I think the possibility ...that someone is going to feel that we have
violated NEPA one way or another is going to grow and ...
we
1974 Annual Meeting of the Am. PoL Sci. Ass'n. in Chicago, Inl., August 29-September 2,

1974).
47.
48.
49.
50.

F. Anderson, supra note 30, at 281.
See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.
Id., ch. 6.
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might get hit with a suit. I think the fact that the Foundation has
always been somewhat of a low profile agency ... is one reason we
haven't had problems.5 1
Judicial review directly enhanced the ability of environmental interests to require procedural implementation of NEPA.
Less appreciated is the impact judicial review had on the complementary oversight activities of CEQ, EPA, and, to a lesser extent, the
Congress. CEQ, whose oversight powers were amplified by Executive
Order shortly after NEPA's enactment, 2 facilitated the transition of
many agencies from the Interpretive to the Formal Compliance Phase
by issuing three sets of progressively more elaborate general guidelines for agency implementation of NEPA, preparing supplemental
memoranda on implementation, and consulting with agency staff
members. These activities closely reflected judicial interpretation of
NEPA. Herbert Stevens, in his analysis of guidelines issued by CEQ,
concludes that the guidelines
are not simply parallel to and separate from the judicial interpretations of NEPA, but are instead a kind of hybrid creation-an
administrative-judicial gloss on the statutory language of NEPA.
Given the advisory position of CEQ with respect to implementation
of NEPA, as contrasted with the position of those mission agencies
of the federal government, the Guidelines draw their strength from
their consolidation of important cases under NEPA. ... Thus, CEQ
has exerted its influence over other, far larger federal agencies by its
ability to first incluence the courts.' '
Absent supportive court decisions, CEQ's role as overseer might have
been less consequential, like that of the Office of Management and
Budget.' 4 Instead, during the Interpretive Phase, when implementation resistance tended to be the strongest, CEQ provided the coordination necessary to assure implementation of specific court decisions
across the administrative process. CEQ also became a focus to which
agencies could turn voluntarily for informal guidance and practical
51. Confidential interview with National Science Foundation official, May 6, 1974.
52. Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality, Exec. Order No. 11514, 3
C.F.R. 286 (1973).
53. The Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and Their Influence on the
National EnvironmentalPolicy Act, 23 Catholic U. L. Rev. 573 (1974).
54. Senator Jackson and Professor Caldweil indicated that they thought OMB would
assume the role delegated to CEQ by Executive Order 11514. Hearingson S. 1075, S. 237,
and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
at 116-17. In fact, OMB has eschewed such a role. See the discussion in F. Anderson, supra
note 30, at 250-53; Morgenthaler, OMB CircularA-95: A Neglected EnvironmentalAssessment Tool Provides an Early Public Pressure Point, 4 Environmental L. Rep. 50043-58
(1974); The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Electricity and the Environ-

ment: The Reform of Legal Institutions 156-59 (1972).
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advice about NEPA implementation.' I Without a semi-authoritative
body, such as CEQ, to resolve the agencies' idiosyncratic uncertainties about how to implement the Act, many of the NEPA liaisons
interviewed reported that their agencies would have moved more
slowly toward formal procedural compliance with the Act.5 6
Unlike CEQ, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), established shortly after NEPA's enactment, 7 initially did not take full
advantage of its potential NEPA-overseer role. Under NEPA, EPA,
like other federal agencies, is required to comment on EIS's that are
referred to it by other agencies. In addition to this responsibility,
EPA, under Section 309 of the Clean Air Act,' 8 has an affirmative
obligation to comment publicly and in writing on the environmental
impact of any matter relating to the agency's duties, regardless of
whether a proposing agency requests such comments.5 9 Proposed
legislation, actions, or regulations that EPA finds unsatisfactory from
the standpoint of public health, welfare, or environmental quality are
to be referred to CEQ.6 I In view of EPA's sizable EIS review staff
and substantive expertise, Section 309 of the Clean Air Act afforded
the agency an opportunity to enter into partnership with CEQ in the
task of overseeing NEPA implementation.
During the Interpretive Phase, EPA limited most of its NEPAoversight activities to preparation of comments on EIS's referred to
it by other agencies. This behavior has been attributed to a variety of
political and organizational problems that beset EPA during its formative years. 6 1 Its publication, for example, of comments critical of
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline draft EIS in 1971 evoked especially hostile
reaction from various agency officials. 6 2 As a consequence, EPA's
authorization under the Clean Air Act to initiate substantive review
of proposals not referred to it for comment remained largely unexercised.
The administrative burden imposed by the requirement of prompt
55. Almost without exception the interview respondents reported that CEQ had provided helpful advise about the many uncertainties that attached to the Act's interpretation

during the period from 1970 to 1972.
56. A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.
57. EPA was created by Exec. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623,
84 Stat. 2086 (effective December, 1970).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h (1970).
59. More detailed discussions of these responsibilities are contained in the references
cited in note 30 supra, and in Healy, The Environmental Protection Agency's Duty to
Oversee NEPA's Implementation: Section 309 of the Clean Air Act, 3 Environmental L.
Rep. 50071-84 (1973).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h (1970).
61. Healy, supra note 59, at 50076.
62. Id. at 50077.
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comment on the many EIS's referred to EPA is evident in the reports
of the NEPA liaisons that were interviewed. They indicated that
EPA's comments tended to be uneven in quality, depending on
which component of the agency was responsible for writing the comments. Despite mixed reactions to the quality of EPA comments
during the Interpretive Phase, the NEPA liaisons reported that routine scrutiny of the substance of their EIS's by EPA quickly forced
them to develop implementation procedures that would permit their
agencies to be responsive to EPA's review standards. This often
meant broadening the data base upon which environmental analyses
were founded and refining the research techniques with which the
implications of the data were explored. Thus, even as a new and
politically inexperienced agency, EPA appears to have contributed to
the development of implementing procedures that signalled the end
of the Interpretive Phase of implementation.
Unlike either CEQ or EPA, Congress, which had enacted NEPA

without significant internal opposition to the Act, evidenced sharp,
internal division over the extent to which NEPA implementation
should be facilitated. A few review hearings were held during
1970-72. They were concerned with agency compliance in general,6 3
the effects of court decisions on specific agencies, 64 and proposals to
amend the Act. 6" The transition of agencies to the Formal Compliance Phase was facilitated more by failure of NEPA's critics to
weaken the Act significantly through amendments and exemptions,
than by the sporadic oversight exercised by the committees that had
supported the Act's passage. The NEPA liaisons reported that they
63. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marineand Fisheries, Environmental
Quality, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,Ad. of the
Nat. Environ. Policy Act, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91-41, pt. 1, II, app. (1970); Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Administration of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, H.R. Rep. No. 92-316, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservationof the House Comm. on MerchantMarine
and Fisheries,Ad. of the Nat. Environ. Policy Act-1972: On NEPA Oversight, February 17,
1972; on Fed. Agency Compliance, May 24, 1972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. ser. 92-94 (1972);
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Fisheriesand Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. ser. 92-25, app. (1972). Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Public Works, Nat. Env. Policy Act Relative to Highways, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Joint Hearingsof the Senate Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs
and Public Works, Nat, Environ. Policy Act, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. ser. 92-H32 (1972).
64. See, Hearings,supra note 40; HearingsBefore the Staff of the Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, Effect of Calvert Cliffs' and Other Court Decisions Upon NuclearPower in
the United States, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. ser. 92-28 (Comm. Print, 1972).
65. An excellent discussion of the political considerations underlying various proposals
to amend NEPA is contained in R. Liroff, supra note 31, ch. 6. See also Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, Nat. Environ. Policy Act of 1969: An Analysis of ProposedLegislative
Modifications-FirstSession, 93d Congress, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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closely monitored efforts to weaken the Act, often hoping that
implementation would not be required if, for example, the EIS requirement were amended out of the Act. When environmentalists
succeeded in countering the initial backlash to the Act, many agencies recognized that they could no longer avoid formal compliance. " In the absence of decisive Congressional action either to
weaken or reaffirm NEPA's mandate, the courts, CEQ, and EPA
became increasingly more legitimate sources of implementation
review. Without their complementary review activities, the transition
to formal compliance with the Act would have been slower and
might not have occurred at all in some instances. These external
forces acted as catalysts for a wide range of internal agency adaptations to NEPA. These adaptations are discussed in the succeeding
section of this paper.
THE FORMAL COMPLIANCE PHASE
During the Formal Compliance Phase of implementation the
agencies no longer debate whether and how they will implement
NEPA. Instead, their attention shifts to implementing the changes
they believe are necessary to accommodate the demands of the Act's
external observers. Detailed procedures are developed, environmental
review offices are set up to assure the implementation of these procedures, budgets are adjusted to include NEPA-related expenditures,
new staff may be hired, existing staff often are retrained and assigned
to environmental review tasks, and research contracts are let. Increasingly more detailed and elaborate EIS's are prepared for a greater
number of agency activities. Some observers of the NEPA implementation process, however, have argued that the environmental
impact analyses produced during the Formal Compliance Phase tend
not to be integrated into the agencies' ongoing decisionmaking
processes.67 Even when the technical quality of an EIS is high, they
66. For discussions of the initial backlash to NEPA see Barfield & Corrigan, Environment

Report!White House Seeks to Restrict Scope of Environment Law, 4 Nat. J. 336-49 (1972),
Hearings on H.R. 14103, a Bill to Amend the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to
Provide a Temporary, Partial Exemption from the Requirements for the Issuance of Environmental Impact Statements before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation

of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 92-29
(1972); especially the testimony of Anthony Roisman of the Save NEPA Coalition, at
196-207; Zeldin, Will Success Spoil NEPA?, Audubon Magazine 105-11 (July 1972);
Higgins, Legislation Under NEPA: Plaintiffs' Phyrrhic Victories Draw Congressional Fire,
Judicial Warnings, 34 Mo. L. Rev. 415-29 (1974).
67. See, e.g., Sandier, NEPA: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?, 37 Brooklyn L. Rev. 139-58
(1970; Sumek, Environmental Impact Statements: Frustration for Local Governments in

The Municipal Year Book-1973 (1973); Fishman, A Preliminary Assessment of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1973 Urban L. Ann. 209-41; Greis, The Envi-
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argue, the statements have little impact on the substantive decisions
made by the agencies. In other words, the production of procedurally and technically satisfactory EIS's that comply formally with
NEPA remains a sterile, bureaucratic exercise, designed only to meet
the letter, not the spirit, of the Act.
This writer believes these conclusions are premature and possibly
incorrect. Assessments that are limited to the short-term effects of
formal compliance may be misleading. The interview data support
the proposition that formal compliance, coupled with continuing
external oversight, sets in motion a variety of new agency routines
and learning processes. 6 8 These internal changes gradually effect a
subtle but pervasive integration of environmental values into many of
the agencies' routine decisionmaking activities. NEPA case studies 6 9
and content analyses of EIS's 7 I often have failed to take into
account the ways in which even the routine production of mediocre
EIS's eventually force most agencies to integrate environmental
values into their ongoing operations. Three patterns of change, which
facilitate this integration, are considered here.
Facilitatingthe Integrationof Environmental Values into Agency
Decisionmaking Through Changes in Proceduresand Structures.
Organizational survival requires adjustments to new conditions
even when agency leadership, staff, or clientele lack sympathy with
the changes required. Kaufman, recognizing this phenomenon, comments that "[t aken all together, the factors making for change in
organizations turn out to be strong enough to overcome the powerful
forces against it."7 1 To come into formal compliance with the implementation requirements of NEPA's external overseers, significant
changes occur in the standard operating procedures (SOP's) and
organizational structures of virtually all agencies.
ronmental Impact Statement: A Small Step Instead of a Giant Leap, 5 The Urban Lawyer

264-303 (1973).
68. A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5. Similar evidence is presented in Council on
Environmental Quality, supra note 18, at 371-81 and CEQ Review of Agency Implementation of NEPA, 5 102 Monitor 3-14 (1975).
69. Recent case studies include Randolph & Ortolano, Effect of NEPA on the Corps of
Engineers' New Melones Project, 1 Colum. J. of Environ. L. 233-73 (1975); Council on
Environmental Quality, A Study of the Implementation of NEPA by the United States Navy
(1974), and The National Environmental Policy Act Process Study: An Evaluation of the
Implementation and Administration of the NEPA by the Forest Service and the Bureau of

Land Management (1975); Tarlock, The Application of the National EnvironmentalPolicy
Act of 1969 to the Darien Gap Highway Project, 7 N.Y.U. J. of Int'l. L. and Pol. 459-73

(1974); Wood, A Prescriptive Analysis of the U.S. Navy's Program to Implement the
NationalEnvironmental Policy Act, 3 Environmental L. Rep. 50049-78 (1975).
70. Enk, supra note 43; Kreith, supra note 23; A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.
71. H. Kaufman, supra note 24, at 66.
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The Type II agencies tend to undergo the most extensive restructuring. Typically, this involves establishment of a specific office
responsible for coordinating and overseeing NEPA implementation
within the agency.' 2 The powers exercised by these offices vary.
They often hold a formal or informal veto power over agency
proposals for which they find the environmental impacts inadequately or improperly evaluated. These offices also tend to communicate regularly with agency leadership, often serving as advocates
for vigorous NEPA implementation. 7 3 They have regular contact
with their agencies' legal staff, with whom they frequently work in
developing internal agency implementing procedures tailored to the
idiosyncracies of their respective agencies. They often control the
types of personnel hired for or assigned to environmental review
activities.7 4 The greater their powers, the more likely they are to
force other operational units within their agencies to seriously and
conscientiously implement NEPA.
The Type I agencies undergo a similar adaptation. Whereas environmental review offices as such often did not exist prior to NEPA in
Type II agencies, the Type I agencies usually had functioning
environmental review offices at the time of NEPA's enactment. The
interview data indicate that these pre-existing offices were also able
to utilize NEPA to justify structural and staffing changes. These
changes usually enable agencies to place greater emphasis on environmental review and put into effect more activities supportive of such
review. This statement by a Coast Guard official is representative of
this change process:
[NEPAl gave us no resources to accomplish these things. So, now
we have been able to justify not only this office ... but staff officers
on district staffs placed there solely for the purpose of working with
environmental assessments and preparing environmental impact
statements and giving advice to program managers who are directly
72. More detailed descriptions of these offices and their powers can be obtained by
examining the NEPA implementation procedures of each agency, which axe published in the
Federal Register. A list of agencies that have issued such procedures is contained in Council
on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality-1974 382-85, along with the relevant
Federal Register references.
73. The importance of information flow for understanding policy implementation is
discussed in Ingram, Information Channels and Environmental Decision Making, 13 Nat.
Res. J, 150-69 (1973).
74. An official of HUD, for example, commented that "if a guy.., was being pushed for
a position ... within the control [of the environmental review office] and if he was
particularly opposed to NEPA, we would raise some questions about it-there's a process
that goes on." Confidential interview with Department of Housing and Urban Development
official, May 17, 1974. Although the selection process alluded to is informal and may affect
the hiring of only certain categories of employees, it illustrates one of the subtle ways in
which environmental review offices influence agency decisionmaking.
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responsible for preparing these statements. ... We are expanding

each 7budget
year in these areas as the need can be shown and justified. 5
The necessity for formal compliance with NEPA usually forces
agency leaders to clarify and enhance the powers of the agency
offices and personnel responsible for reviewing the environmental
effects of agency proposals and activities. In many instances this
means training and reassigning existing personnel to NEPA responsibilities, as well as introducing new environmental professionals into
the agency. 7 6 The latter often bring with them an outlook and
values previously absent or underemphasized in agency planning.7 7
Recognizing their responsibility to keep their agencies out of court
and free from adverse review by CEQ and the committees of Congress, the staff of the environmental review offices tend to be
strongly motivated to bring other agency components into formal
compliance with NEPA.
The most extensive restructuring occurs in the Type III agencies.
Without the enactment of NEPA, it is unlikely that any significant
procedural or structural changes to implement formal environmental
review would have occurred in most of these agencies. Their cognizance of the impact of external oversight on Type I and Type II
agencies forces the Type III agencies to devise mechanisms with
which to implement the Act, even when they perceive it to be only
tangentially applicable to their activities.7 8 Without external oversight, agency leadership, especially within Type II and Type III
agencies, would tend to dismiss implementation of NEPA as unnecessary or too costly, given other agency priorities.7 9
75. Confidential interview with U.S. Coast Guard official, May 21, 1974.

76. Virtually all of the agencies significantly involved in activities that have environmental impacts reported the development of special training and educational programs, both
for staff and leadership. Similarly, transfers of personnel and the hiring of new personnel to
expand agency competence in environmental analysis were commonplace. For more detailed
discussions of these changes see A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.

77. H. Kaufman, supra note 24, at 56-58. He argues that "[n] ewcomers to organizations,
no matter how carefully screened, bring with them values and perceptions at least a little
divergent from those prevailing among members and leaders of long standing. ... [Hence]
new viewpoints will creep into every organization regardless of efforts to keep them
out... ."Id., at 42.
78. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency has published NEPA implemental procedures, 39 Fed. Reg. 3579 (1974). Similarly, in an interview with an official of the Federal
Trade Commission, it was noted that NEPA has "perked a lot of people up to considerations

that they might not have particularly faced before." Confidential interview with Federal
Trade Commission official, May 17, 1974.
79. The interview respondents almost always reported that implementation would have
occurred more rapidly and would have been more extensive if the Act had authorized

special appropriations for that purpose. Some agencies requested such appropriations when
it became apparent that formal compliance could not be avoided.

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 16

For example, the General Services Agency, a Type III agency, was
able to provide documentation of significant environmental review of
its construction projects initiated as a consequence of establishing an
environmental review office to oversee NEPA implementation. 8"
Similarly, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which
had no environmental review office prior to the enactment of NEPA,
reported that while the department "did not really do very much in
the first couple of years [of the Act's history] ," when then-Secretary
Elliot Richardson "got concerned about [NEPA], he established a
task force to see how the Department might better comply with the
law itself and also the spirit of the law." 8 I As a consequence of the
report issued by Richardson's task force, HEW established an environmental review office responsible for bringing the department
into compliance with NEPA.8 2
The importance of institutionalizing NEPA review structures
within the agencies cannot be overemphasized. Initially these structures focus on implementation of procedural changes. After these
procedures are securely in place and operating adequately, the
environmental review offices begin the difficult task of integrating
them into their agencies' ongoing decisionmaking routines. The interview data suggest that these offices recognize the need for integration
well before they concentrate on achieving it.8 I Most agencies
reported that education of agency staff would be slow and haphazard
without prior implementation of procedures and guidelines for
environmental analysis.8 4 Therefore, an initial period of enforced
procedural compliance with NEPA implementation policies tends to
precede initiatives by the environmental review offices to integrate
these changes into agency decisionmaking routines.
During the period in which formal compliance is achieved, the
environmental review offices become increasingly adroit at internal
agency politicking. The continuation of external oversight enhances
their legitimacy as participants in internal agency politics.8 I Simi80. Confidential interview with General Services Administration official, May 16, 1974;
General Services Administration, Man, Construction and the Environment (1973) and Build
the Environment Up for People: Final Report-August 1973 (1973).
81. Confidential interview with Department of Health, Education and Welfare official,
May 17, 1974.
82. Id.
83. A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.
84. Id.
85. It is noteworthy that thus far in the NEPA implementation process Presidential

support for vigorous implementation has been lacking. See, e.g., Noone, Environment
Report/NEPA suffers setback in housing, wins transit attack, 6 Nat'l. J.1269 (1974). It
could be argued, however, that legitimacy achieved without such support enhances the
likelihood that these offices will remain an integral part of their respective agencies.
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larly, their specialized knowledge of legislative hearings, court
decisions, recommendations of agency general counsel, and demands
of environmental interest groups, combined with their appreciation
of specific agency implementation problems, enable the environmental review offices to become increasingly significant brokers in
agency decisionmaking. Whereas environmentalists and other oversight bodies must wait until a proposal is presented for comment to
evaluate it (unless invited to participate at an earlier stage of policymaking), the internal environmental review offices can take actions
in anticipation of implementation problems. These actions may take
the form of lobbying with agency leadership, developing special
training programs, formulating guidelines, substantive review of new
proposals, or improving the coordination of agency environmental
assessment activities.8 6 Without the presence of specialized staff and
structures for NEPA implementation within the agencies, compliance
with the Act might be expected to decrease. Kaufman offers this
generalized description of the impact that offices such as these tend
to have on the implementation of a new policy:
Merely to announce or publish requirements is not enough; they
have to be policed. So specialized personnel, and perhaps specialized
organizational units, are assigned to make sure that the rules are
obeyed. They perform their mission by issuing ... guidelines and
policy statements and requirements, by offering advice and opinions

in advance of action to colleagues who request them, and by exposing or even disallowing actions that were8 7taken in their sphere of

responsibility and seem to them improper.

The interview respondents consistently indicated that external NEPA
oversight provided the impetus for implementing many of the structural and procedural changes required to come into formal compliance with the Act. Without such oversight, many agencies indicated
that their implementation activities would have depended on further
clarification of the Act by Congress, special appropriations to
implement it, or clearer guidance from the President on the extent of
implementation required. Ironically, once formal procedural
compliance with the Act is achieved, many of the former sources of
resistance to its implementation8 8 begin to work to sustain implementation.
86. A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.
87. H. Kaufman, supra note 24, at 34.
88. See notes 25-43 supra and accompanying text.
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Facilitatingthe Integrationof Environmental Values into Agency
Decisionmaking Through Improvements in the Collection and
Analysis of EnvironmentalData.
Closely related to the appearance of new procedures and structures within the agencies during the Formal Compliance Phase are
changes in the amount and types of environmental data they collect
and in the techniques they use to analyze it. When the interviews for
this paper were conducted in mid-1974, most of the environmental
review offices that had been established were especially concerned
about ensuring informational adequacy in their agencies' EIS's.
Most of the Type I and Type II agencies were able to document
extensive upgrading of their environmental data collection systems
during the Formal Compliance Phase." 9 Special efforts are made to
identify environmentally significant actions and to ascertain their
possible impacts. Many of the NEPA liaisons, however, noted that
this upgrading was often due to overreaction by their field staffs to
adverse court decisions, CEQ guidelines, and public criticism. The
result was the production by some agencies of encyclopedic EIS's
that failed to relate the voluminous information presented to the
environmental impacts that alternative actions might produce. 9 0 The
liaisons recognized that even if such statements withstand court
scrutiny, they fail to comply with the spirit of NEPA. Further, they
recognized that the high costs of producing unnecessarily lengthy
statements might trigger renewed attacks on NEPA by its Congressional critics.9 1
89. A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.
90. The NEPA liaisons appreciated that the Act could be thwarted by staff who chose
uncritically to collect more and more information without taking into account the importance of the action or of the information collected. A number of commentators have noted
that this tendency has been encouraged by certain court decisions as much as by agency
insensitivity to NEPA. See Higgins, supra note 66; Collins, The National Policy Act of 1969:
The Influence of Agency Differences on Judicial Enforcement, 52 Tex. L Rev. 1227-45
(1974); Dreyfus & Ingram, supra note 7; C. Ash, supra note 18; Culhane, FederalAgency
OrganizationalChange in Response to Environmentalism, 2 Humboldt J. of Soc. Relations
31-44 (1974); Edmonds, The National Environmental Policy Act Applied to Policy-Level
Decisionmaking, 3 Ecology L.Q. 799, 817-23 (1973). Conversely, some liaisons reported
that their agencies had produced only a few EIS's (if any) because they lacked adequate
environmental indices and interpretive techniques, a fact acknowledged by CEQ in Environmental Quality-1974. Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 18, at 331-35.
91. See Higgins, supra note 66, for a discusssion of the costs of NEPA implementation.
The Council on Environmental Quality has estimated that NEPA costs might be as high as
$65 million annually once full implementation is underway. See Council on Environmental
Quality, Environmental Quality-1972: The Third Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality 258 (1972). This amount is apportioned among seventeen agencies in N.
Orloff, The Environmental Impact Statement Process 54 (unpublished paper presented at
the Environmental Impact Statement Seminar of the Twin Cities Fed. Exec. Bd., Minneapolis, Minn., February 6, 1973).
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The NEPA liaisons also expressed agreement that carefully devised
procedures for data collection and analysis would not necessarily
lead to good faith consideration of environmental impacts in agency
decisionmaking. Nonetheless they saw the development of improved
bases of environmental data and experience with techniques for its
analysis as prerequisites for any future efforts they might undertake
to transform legal compliance into more meaningful policy analysis.
Without credible data and staff able to analyze it, the NEPA liaisons
doubted that their offices could ever hope to be an integral part of
agency decisionmaking. Consequently, during the Formal Compliance Phase they emphasize preparation of informationally and
analytically sufficient EIS's. Even when these statements are not
fully integrated into the agencies' final decisionmaking, the new data
collection and analysis procedures are becoming an integral part of
the agencies' SOP's.
The Formal Compliance Phase also evidences new research initiatives by many of the Type I and Type II agencies, including funding
contract research and retaining consultants to provide environmental
information and analytic skills not available in-house. 2 The agencies
that initially depended on data from their clientele in preparing EIS's
begin to take a more active part in specifying data requirements and
in monitoring their clienteles' response to these specifications. 9
Agency clientele, in turn, begin to recognize that failure to provide
adequate environmental information may mean costly delays in or
disapproval of their requests for government projects, loans, or
permits.9 4 Agencies such as the former Atomic Energy Commission,
the Federal Power Commission, and the Army Corps of Engineers,
for the first time began to conduct environmental analyses of alternatives not within their mandates to implement.
The larger, wealthier agencies generally find it less difficult to alter
their priorities and budgets to accommodate NEPA's requirement
that EIS's and environmental assessements reflect the utilization of a
"systematic, interdisciplinary approach" to environmental analysis
that will "insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences
92. A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.
93. Id.
94. This statement, by an official of the Rural Electrification Administration, is typical:
We have to live with our borrowers and we don't like to dissipate our goodwill
unnecessarily. Initially this whole thing impressed them as being utterly ludicrous and ridiculous. If it had been only our own views we would have had a
hard time. They didn't know how much this was for real and how much was
just words that could be ignored. Court litigation and public comment enables
us to put a lot more pressure on our borrowers to get them to do things the
way they ought to.
Confidential interview with Rural Electrification Administration official, May 2, 1974.
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and environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking. ' '
Smaller, less well-financed agencies, and those with the least experience in environmental management, often must seek special appropriations to upgrade their informational base. The Type I agencies
especially utilize the Formal Compliance Phase to demonstrate the
need for funds and staff to upgrade the study of the social and
secondary impacts of their proposed actions and to conduct systems
research and follow-up studies. The Type II agencies are more
inclined simply to deplore the absence of systems research and the
extensive baseline data necessary for follow-up studies. These problems, they contend, should be remedied by Congressionally
requested studies performed by agencies such as the National Science
Foundation, the National Academy of Science, or by Type I agencies
whose mandates explicitly include protection of the environment.
Although it is difficult to generalize about the specific factors that
cause an agency to upgrade its environmental analysis capabilities,
the necessity of preparing EIS's capable of passing internal agency
review and possible judicial scrutiny has resulted in virtually all
agencies improving their pre-NEPA capabilities for environmental
analysis to some extent. An official of EPA offered this favorable
evaluation of these agency-wide changes:
"

[The capability to measure environmental impacts] has increased
hordes and magnitudes since the Act was passed. And it varies from
agency to agency, but by-and-large, all of the9 major agencies either
now have it or are well underway to having it. 6
Facilitatingthe Integration of Environmental Values into Agency
Decisionmaking Through IncreasedInter-Governmentaland
Public Review of ProposedAgency Actions.
NEPA requires that each agency, prior to undertaking actions
significantly affecting the environment, "consult and obtain the
comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or
special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved."" ' The comments thus obtained, as well as those from
relevant state and local agencies, must accompany the draft EIS
"through the existing agency review procedures" and are to be
disclosed and considered in the final EIS. 9 s CEQ's implementation
95. NEPA § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1970).
96. Confidential interview with Environmental Protection Agency official, May 22,
1974.
97. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
98. Id.
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guidelines further provide that interested groups and individuals shall
have the same privilege to offer comments on draft EIS's. 9 9
These provisions for the first time formalized and legitimized
access to agency decisionmaking by any interested party when
environmentally significant activities are involved. o0 Type I agencies experienced the least difficulty in implementing these commenting and disclosure provisions. Since they considered many
environmental agencies and interest groups to be part of their policy
subsystem prior to NEPA's enactment, the Act did not require significiant adjustments in terms of the interests to which these agencies
were responsive. It did, however, tend to enhance the bargaining
power of these interests.' 0'
The liaisons for the Type I agencies also noted that formation of
environmental review offices contributed to the rationalization of
the commenting process. This process, they indicated, existed prior
to NEPA, but was poorly coordinated, loosely structured and highly
informal." 02 The environmental review offices quickly became the
focal point within each agency for NEPA-related activities, making it
easier for concerned parties to make known their concerns early in
an agency's decisionmaking process, especially if an agency is decentralized. 1 0 3 The liaisons further noted that the commenting process
facilitated more frequent informal interactions at the staff level by
personnel of the administrative agencies. One consequence of this
development has been less attention to preparation of formal comments on a draft EIS when informal discussions and understandings
have been reached early in an agency's decisionmaking process., 04
99. Council on Environmental Quality, Guidelines for Statements on Proposed Actions
Affecting the Enwironment, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7725-26 (1971).
100. The importance of access by environmental interests to the decisionmaking activities of the federal agencies is discussed in W. Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental

Concern 266-68 (1973), and generally, in Ingram, supra note 73, and Cuihane, supra note
89.
101. A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.

102. Id.
103. For example, the Forest Service, a highly decentralized agency, delegates the actual
preparation of EIS's to its field offices. By setting up an environmental review office in

Washington, D.C., however, it is able to route comments and requests for information to the
appropriate field offices, and to coordinate the preparation of EIS's that involve more than
one component of the agency.
104. A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5. The Environmental Protection Agency reported
that it had requested special appropriations to set up early liaison positions to improve
communication on NEPA matters between EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers, the
Department of Transportation, and the Soil Conservation Service. The purpose of these
positions is to "start a dialogue early in the game so that EPA can make clear the kinds of
things [it isi going to be looking for in these agencies' projects." Confidential interview with
Environmental Protection Agency official, May 24, 1974. Similar findings obtained for
:ther Type I and Type 11 agencies.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 16

NEPA's review provisions also expanded the number and kinds of
interests that regularly participate in agency decisionmaking, often
forcing even the Type I agencies to consider a wider range of alternatives in more depth than they otherwise would.II 5 The Type I
agencies acknowledged that NEPA had forced them to confront
more directly the criticism of other administrative agencies with
relevant expertise but different environmental philosophies. For
example, the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture
now must formally consider the comments of the Bureau of Land
Management in the Department of Interior. The latter agency tends
to favor significantly different land use planning concepts than does
the former.1 06 Similarly the Forest Service sometimes uses the
commenting process to criticize proposals by another agency within
the Department of Agriculture, the Rural Electrification Administra-

tion.'

07

During the Formal Compliance Phase, Type I agencies clarify lines
of communication with those agencies and interests that are most
concerned about their activities. In addition to facilitating earlier
input of information from these groups, NEPA has forced these
agencies to develop a set of expectations about the kinds of
comments other agencies and interests will make and the informational resources necessary to respond to these comments. Thus, the
expectation that EPA will require a certain type of response to their
comments forces many of these agencies initially to structure their
environmental reviews in ways that will accommodate EPA's requirements. Changes of this kind contribute to more rational use of
environmental information across the administrative process and
alleviate delays and misunderstandings when a draft EIS is released.
A variety of formal and informal advance notice systems that call
attention to the anticipated preparation of an EIS have been implemented by many of these agencies. The diverse lists of names
included in these notification systems evidence NEPA's contribution
to earlier involvement of old and new participants in agency decisionmaking.' 0 8
105. A thorough discussion of the obligations of agencies to discuss alternatives under
NEPA is provided in Jordan, Alternatives Under NEPA: Toward an Accommodation, 3

Ecology L. Q. 705-57 (1973).
106. Confidential interviews with Bureau of Land Management official, May 14, 1974,

and with U.S. Forest Service official, May 23, 1974.
107. Confidential interview with U.S. Forest Service official, May 23, 1974.

108. The Army Corps of Engineers showed this writer a list of 5,000 names to whom
notices of one public meeting were sent. Extensive lists are retained by agencies such as the
Nuclear Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and the Soil
Conservation Service. See A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.
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The Type II agencies reported more extensive alterations in their
policy subsystems during the Formal Compliance Phase as a consequence of NEPA's commenting and disclosure provisions. An official
of the Federal Power Commission, for example, noted that private
commentators "giv[e] us information that people at the state and
federal level can't give or might not be aware of or for political
reasons not be willing to disclose to us."' 09 Similarly, a HUD official noted that it is more difficult for their staff and clientele selectively to conceal information on environmental impacts and to
dismiss as inconsequential legitimate areas of concern.*1 0 Although
most of the Type II agencies traditionally have worked closely with
private interests in making environmentally significant decisions, the
EIS process has required these agencies to expose these relationships
and the policies in which they result to closer scrutiny. During the
Formal Compliance Phase the field staff of the Type IIagencies are
forced to develop an appreciation of the interests and concerns of
commentators who previously were not included in agency decisionmaking. The field staff, in turn, communicate many of the informational demands of these new interests to their traditional clientele,
forcing these groups to adapt to greater involvement by environmentalists in agency decisionmaking. This tends to facilitate interaction among environmental and economic interests that seldom
occurred prior to NEPA.
The most extensive policy subsystem adjustments occur in Type
III agencies. For the first time, these agencies often are forced to
open their activities and decisionmaking processes to Type I and
Type II agencies and environmental interest groups. Type III agencies begin formally to consider indirect and long-range impacts of
many of their activities as well as the immediate implications of these
activities! 1 'I These activities require development of new data
gathering capabilities and adoption of new procedures for disclosing
the information generated about the environmental impacts of their
activities.
The Formal Compliance Phase also provides all three types of
agencies with experience in analyzing the comments prepared by the
new groups introduced into their policy subsystems. The extent of
access and influence achieved by these groups depends in part on the
109. Confidential interview with Federal Power Commission official, May 3, 1974.
110. Confidential interview with Department of Housing and Urban Development official, May 17, 1974.
111. For example, the Federal Trade Commission became aware of possible indirect and
long-term environmental effects of many of its activities. See confidential interview, supra
note 78.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 16

quality of the comments they submit during the Formal Compliance
Phase. If they demonstrate a high level of expertise, they will be
likely to receive considerable deference from the agencies in the
future.' 1 2 Their views will be actively solicited early in agency
decisionmaking. But if their comments are considered frivolous or
uninformed, they will probably receive more perfunctory treatment
in the future and may be excluded from early agency decisionmaking
entirely. The interview respondents indicated that the quality of
comments evoked by the NEPA commenting process varies tremendously and that the environmental review offices quickly
determine which comments warrant careful consideration. However,
the possibility of court challenges on procedural grounds has effectively forced the agencies formally to consider and disclose even
those comments they would prefer to ignore.
THE TRANSITION TO THE INTEGRATED PLANNING PHASE
An interval of one or two years is usually required to develop and
implement the procedures and structures necessary to come into
formal compliance with NEPA. Likewise, the adaptations required in
agency data collection and analysis systems and in their policy subsystems occur slowly and incrementally. When these changes in the
way environmental values are treated have been accomplished and
are functioning smoothly, agency attention tends to shift away from
formal NEPA implementation toward integration of implementation
changes into routine agency decisionmaking processes. At the point
when this shift consistently evidences small but measurable effects
on the substance of agency decisions, the Formal Compliance Phase
has effectively ended and a third, or Integrated Planning Phase, has
begun.
Whether and when an agency undergoes this important transition
primarily depends on the extent and kinds of changes undertaken by
the agency during the Formal Compliance Phase. The changes that
occur during that phase tend to take on the same self-perpetuating
characteristics of other agency SOP's during the Integrated Planning
Phase. Kaufman, for example, notes that
[a] fter an organization has been changed even a little, it begins to
freeze into its new pattern almost at once; it does not remain loosely
structured and flexible.' 13
Consequently, the more pervasive an agency's efforts formally to
112. A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.
113. H. Kaufman, supra note 24, at 68.
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implement NEPA, the more likely it will be to exhibit the SOP's
most likely to facilitate a transition to the Integrated Planning Phase
of implementation.
This transition is also facilitated by continued judicial scrutiny of
agency procedural compliance with NEPA and critical review of both
procedural and substantive compliance by CEQ and EPA.1 14 Continuation of external review of procedural compliance permits
agency environmental staff to concentrate their attention on NEPA's
substantive policy objectives, which are summarized in section 101
of the Act.' 1 ' This requires increasing emphasis on integrating the
results of agency environmental review activities into other agency
decisionmaking routines. CEQ, often through informal contacts with
agency NEPA liaisons,' 6 and EPA, through increasingly more vigorous use of its commenting prerogatives under Section 309 of the
Clean Air Act,' ' help legitimize the efforts of the environmental
review offices to shift emphasis toward NEPA's substantive implementation.
One source of evidence that an agency has shifted from formal
compliance to substantive implementation is the content of the EIS's
the agency issues. During the Formal Compliance Phase the informational content of EIS's improves. However, the statements' findings
tend to remain poorly related to the alternatives selected. They also
tend to be prepared apart from other ongoing agency decisionmaking
routines. During the Integrated Planning Phase, the agencies' EIS's
and the negotiations they reflect become integral to the substantive
decisions made by the agencies. EIS's prepared during this phase
more clearly delineate the relationship between the environmental
impacts disclosed and the decisions made by the agencies.
THE INTEGRATED PLANNING PHASE
The interview respondents reported that the transition to the
Integrated Planning Phase reflected their recognition that the continued viability of NEPA (and, by implication, of their offices and
114. CEQ, for example, has institutionalized a biannual review of agency implementation
of NEPA, focusing on the use of NEPA in decisionmaking, EIS content and quality, the
review and commenting process, and public participation in the NEPA process. Special

problems, peculiar to particular agencies, are also reviewed in staff level meetings. See

Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 68. EPA has begun to release guidelines for
review of specific kinds of projects and has begun to assert its prerogatives under § 309 of

the Clean Air Act. See, e.g., EPA Guidelines for Review of Environmental Impact Statements: Volume 1-Highway Projects (1973).
115. NEPA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
116. See note 114, supra, and A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.
117. See note 114, supra.
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jobs) depends not only on keeping projects out of court and free
from adverse comments, but also on a demonstration that there are
substantive benefits to be derived from the Act's costly implementation. Accordingly, as the Integrated Planning Phase begins, the
environmental review offices concentrate less on procedural change
and more on effecting environmentally desirable substantive changes
in particular agency proposals and activities.
Throughout the interviews with the three types of agencies, NEPA
liaisons frequently stated that they could not give enough attention
to implementing NEPA's substantive policies until formal, procedural
implementation was nearly complete and operating smoothly. Even
then they reported problems, such as lack of techniques with which
to accurately evaluate long-term, cumulative, and secondary environmental impacts.' 1 Nonetheless, integrating the substantive findings
of environmental impact analyses into agency actions increasingly
absorbs the attention of the agencies' environmental review offices.
An official of HEW's environmental review office offered this
characterization of that agency's gradual transition into the
Integrated Planning Phase:
Section 101 [of NEPAJ, which is the policy of doing good things for
the environment, is something we are building up to, but we don't
want to try to implement it at the same time we are implementing
Section 102. Until people understand what an environmental effect
is, it is difficult to come out with a series of value judgments concerning which effects are good and which are bad. We're moving into
Section 101 slowly. 19
The direction of the slow movement described by the HEW
respondent is evident in many agencies. There is an explicit emphasis
on making the environmental review process substantively meaningful. Both Type I and Type II agencies that were entering the Integrated Planning Phase when the field research was conducted could
document the modification, rejection, or cancellation of specific
projects or activities as a direct consequence of the environmental
impact analyses that were conducted under NEPA. 2 These agencies often indicated that integrated planning and the substantive
changes it produces reflected improved staff cooperation in implementing the spirit of the Act, as well as encouragement from agency
leadership and aggressive work by their environmental review office
118. These problems are discussed in A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5, 10.
119. Confidential interview with Department of Health, Education and Welfare official
May 17, 1974.
120. A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.
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staff, who were eager to preserve their hard won accomplishments of
the Formal Compliance Phase. Continuation of education programs
and improvements in data collection systems also were mentioned as
factors that contributed to the integration of environmental review
activities into routine agency decisionmaking processes. The Federal
Highway Administration, which was accused early in the Act's history of deliberately engaging in excessive procedural implementation,1 2 ' reported that
[they had gotten] a lot of guidance out of the courts ... and
[recognized] that [they had] generated an awful lot of paperwork
that wasn't necessary.... But [now NEPA implementation is] going
to settle down to where it really is just part of our normal planning

process.'

22

The same phenomenon was reported by the Army Corps of Engineers, the second largest producer of EIS's:
Now [we have some projects] that [we] have started with the last
year where we think we have as good a scheme as anybody, whereby
you can bring these environmental issues into the planning processes
at the right time and truly implement the intent of NEPA. And we
haven't really ... had a chance before to do this.' 2 3
During the Integrated Planning Phase agencies also are no longer
troubled by a backlog of projects that were already in progress at the
time of NEPA's enactment and on which important decisions had
been made. And they have had sufficient time to learn what activities
require EIS's or assessments. The results of contract research, the use
of consultants, and the availability of guidelines from agencies such
as EPA also facilitate integration of NEPA into agency routines. 24
At the time the interviews were conducted most of the Type I and
Type II agencies appeared to be entering or about to enter the Integrated Planning Phase of implementation. The same process is likely
to occur for the Type III agencies as they gain additional experience
from formal procedural implementation of the Act. Whether the
internal dynamics developed during the Formal Compliance Phase
will be sufficient to sustain the transition to the Integrated Planning
Phase for these agencies is uncertain . 1 2 s Even more uncertain is
121. Sullivan & Montgomery, Surveying Highway Impact, 14 Environment, 12-20

(1972).
122. Confidential interview with Federal Highway Administration official, May 20,

1974.
123. Confidential interview with Army Corps of Engineers official, May 31, 1974.
124. Similar findings are reported by CEQ. See Council on Environmental Quality, supra

note 18, at 371-72, 378-81.
125. Since the involvement of Type III agencies in environmental review is less extensive
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whether at least some agencies will move from the Integrated Planning Phase to what is termed here a "Programmatic Planning Phase"
of implementation.
A TRANSITION TO A PROGRAMMATIC PLANNING PHASE?
The substantive changes characteristic of the Integrated Planning
Phase tend to be project specific. The interview respondents, when
asked whether the Act had had or would have similar effects on their
agencies' long range policies, plans, regulations, guidelines, legislative
proposals and budgetary requests, indicated that the application of
NEPA to these areas of agency activity was still difficult to document.' 26 The respondents acknowledged that NEPA was applicable
at programmatic and policymaking levels, but they identified several
obstacles to its implementation at these levels that were less applicable to the incremental changes effected in specific projects. 2 7
Specifically, the respondents noted that the federal courts had not
yet fully clarified the extent to which they would require strict
procedural compliance with NEPA for programmatic and policy-level
activities.' 28 And since these activities usually involve high-level
agency policymakers, the respondents felt that their strategies for
achieving substantive change through staff reeducation would be less
effective when programmatic planning was involved. Policymakers,
they noted, are directly subject to political pressures from political
elites in the Congress and other governmental bodies, a factor that
may sometimes render them less responsive than agency staff to
input from environmental analysts and interests.'2 9 Consequently,
even if the courts were to require EIS's for agency programs and
policymaking activities (something many scholars consider unlikely),' 3o there is no assurance that the environmental analyses
than that of the Type I and Type II agencies, their investment in NEPA implementation is
less substantial. They also come under less public and intergovernmental scrutiny in most
instances. Consequently, it could be plausibly hypothesized that these agencies would be
more likely than either the Type I or Type II agencies to undergo a regression back to the
Formal Compliance Phase if either the external or internal forces facilitating implementa-

tion were significantly weakened.
126. A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Comment, Sierra Club Seeks to Require NEPA Impact Statement on
Annual Appropriations Proposals, 5 Environmental Law Rep. 10071-74 (1975); Frederick
Anderson's proposal of multiple statements on the same subject matter in his article, supra
note 30, at 362065.
129. A. Wichelman, supra note 15, ch. 5, 10.
130. The debate over substantive judicial review under NEPA is explicated in numerous
law review articles, including Yarrington, JudicialReview of Substantive Agency Decisions:

A Second Generation of Cases Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 19 South
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produced would become an integral part of the policy-level decisions
ultimately reached.
Most of the Type II and Type III agencies, therefore, cannot be
expected to move into a Programmatic Planning Phase of implementation. Without sympathetic Presidential, Congressional, and
internal agency leadership, the agencies' internal environmental
review staffs will lack the requisite means significantly to alter
agency policies. Efforts by CEQ to promote preparation of programmatic, generic, and umbrella impact statements 1 31 will facilitate the
movement of Type I agencies into the Programmatic Planning Phase
32
when sympathetic leadership already exists within these agencies.
CEQ, in its most recent annual report, indicates that there has
been a sharp increase in the number of program statements prepared
by the agencies.' 3 3 Examples of these include EIS's for the development of the liquid metal fast breeder reactor, the use of herbicides in
different states and regions by the Department of Agriculture, and
the tanker construction program of the Department of Commerce.1 3 It is still too early to determine whether the application
of NEPA to broad-ranging policy-level decisions will significantly
alter the substance of such decisions as extensively as it has the
substance of individual projects and actions.
Edward Strohbehn, among others, has argued that
[i]
f EPA and CEQ would adopt firm procedures and cooperate in
implementing them, the most environmentally destructive projects
and programs of the federal government would be subjected to
Dakota L. Rev. 279-94 (1974); Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 Harvard L. Rev. 735-58 (1975); Kumin, Substantive Review
Under the National Environmental Policy Act: EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 3 Ecology L. Q.

173-208 (1973); Arnold, The Substantive Right to Environmental Quality Under the
NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act, 3 Environmental L. Rep. 50028-43 (1973).
131. CEQ's most recent set of guidelines encourages the use of program or generic
statements. See Preparationof EnvironmentalImpact Statements: Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. t.
1500 38 Fed. Reg. 20549 (1973). The Council has also stated that although "program
statements do not yet form a large proportion of the total number of statements, they offer
an unprecedented opportunity to analyze major policy issues associated with the formulation of government programs. CEQ strongly encourages agencies to prepare such statements
in the development of new programs and in the review of modification of programs already
in operation." Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 18, at 393.
132. There is little published data on the attitudes of policymakers toward NEPA implementation. Edward L. Strohbehn, Jr., argues that "NEPA can be expected to have only a
limited impact on agency decisionmaking, particularly at the policy levels" because "there
generally is little dialogue between agency policymakers and environmentalists." NEPA's
Impact on Federal Decisionmaking: Examples of Noncompliance and Suggestions for
Change, 4 Ecology L. Q. 93, 104 (1974). See also, Edmonds, supra note 90.
133. Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 18, at 392.
134. Id. at 392-93.
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intensive public scrutiny which should result in their termination or
substantial modification. 1"
This writer agrees that such actions by EPA and CEQ would result in
greater public scrutiny of the policies involved. But whether this
scrutiny would force substantial change in these policies, as Strohbehn suggests, is less certain. Unlike the modification of specific
projects, the substantial alteration of broad agency policies in an
effort to implement NEPA's Section 101 policy goals requires the
agencies to, in effect, supplement or amend their enabling legislation.
Indeed Section 103 directs the agencies to consider NEPA in this
manner.' 3 6 Nonetheless, in the absence of strong pressures to do so,
the agencies not fully in sympathy with NEPA's policy goals might
be expected to seek statutory exemption for the programs involved
before voluntarily complying with directives from CEQ, EPA, or,1 for
37
that matter, the courts, to implement programmatic planning.
Only if these efforts failed could most of the Type II and Type III
agencies be expected to integrate environmental values into their
policy-level planning and programmatic activities.
SUMMARY
Diagram 1 summarizes the conceptual framework developed and
interpreted in this paper. The framework shows that the implementation of policies across the administrative process is a complex
phenomenon in which procedural and substantive change are highly
interrelated. Undue attention to the contribution of any single institution or actor may cause the researcher to overlook others that are
equally important.
NEPA process and case studies will further refine the relationships
shown in the diagram. More detailed case studies may also be
expected to identify additional internal agency variables relevant to
135. Strohbehn, supra note 136.
136. NEPA § 103,42 U.S.C. § 4323 (1970).
137. The initial backlash to NEPA in Congress is discussed at note 66, supra and
accompanying text. A second backlash of more modest proportions is considered in Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Amending the NationalEnvironmental Policy
Act to Clarify the Federaland State Roles in the Preparationof EnvironmentalAnalyses of
Certain Federal Programs, Sen. Rep. 16, 94-152, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See also CEQ
Comments on NEPA Amendments, 5 102 Monitor 3-25 (1975), and two advisory memoranda by CEQ, Delegation by FederalAgencies of Responsibilityfor Preparationof Environmental Impact Statements, (1974) and Application of the National Environmental Policy
Act to Enforcement of the Anti-Trust Laws by the Federal Trade Commission (1975).
These documents point up the continuing possibility of hostile agencies seeking statutory
exemption from NEPA for particular programs, especially when they find the implementation process difficult to adapt to the programs involved.
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understanding different rates and patterns of implementation. The
framework presented here is intended to facilitate the comparison of
research already completed and to suggest fruitful areas for further
research. It should also facilitate formulation and testing of generalizations about NEPA implementation in particular, and public policy
implementation in general.

Diagram I
A Conceptual Framework for Explaining Differential NEPAImplementation
By the Administrative Agencies
Interpretive Phase
Agency Leadership
-Uncertainty about NEPA's operational
meaning for specific agency programs
(especially those initiated before
NEPAwas enacted)
-Uncertainty about the extent of oversight Congress. the courts, aendthe
Executive branch will exercise
-Resistance to extensive agency
reorganization based on political
and economic expediency
Agency Staff
-Confusion about the lines of responsibility for NEPA implementation
-Resistance to extensive agency
reorganization by staff benefiting
from existing arrangements, and
from those upon whomthe burdens
of implementation would devolve
Agency Clientele
-Resistance to changes that might
weaken their bargaining power within
their client agency's policy subsystem and impose upon them added
costs and burdens

A ency
Enviromental Imp4ct Statements
-Generally of poor quality, emphasizing
in-house descriptive data that is
poorly related to the action proposed
-Generally prepared on an ad hoc basis,
usually separate from and late in the
agency's decision-making processes

Intervening Events
Facilitating
-Litigation by emvironmentalists resultsin court decisions requiring
strict procedural
compliance
-Executive Order
11514 is issued

Inhibiting
-Opposition to
court decisions
by agencies and
their clientele
-Congressional
hearings on implementation costs
-Introduction of

-CEQ Oversight:
amendments to
Guidelines, Mamor- weaken NEPA
aeda, and Consul-Refusal by OMBto
tations
-WeakEPAOversight
under 6 309 of the
Clean Air Act
-Congressional Oversight Hearings on
compl iance

require EIS's for
most proposed legislation
-Emergence of the
energy crisis and
recession as major
policy issues
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Diagram I Continued

Formal Compliance Phase
Agency Leadership
-Structural reorganization is approved.
often establishing new offices for environmental review and coordination
-Internalagency implementing procedures and guidelines are approved
-Resources are reallocated to implement
NEPA; budgets are adjusted to include
NEPA expenditures
Agency Staff

Intervening Events
-Court decisions continue to require
strict procedural compliance
-Organized opposition to NEPAin the
legislative process lessens after
falling to significantly weaken the Act

-Lines of responsibility for NEPAimplementation are defined

-CEQ continues to monitor and coordinate
agency implementation progress

-Existing staff are trained and assigned
to NEPAimplementation; new staff are
hired to meet specialrequirements

-EPAbegins to exercise more active
oversight through the review of EIS's
and consultations with agencies on
the use of techniques for environmental
impact assessment

-Staff are exposed to new informational
inputs through the comments of other
agencies and the public on draft EIS's
and through the use of consultants and
the introduction of new personnel into
the agency
Agency Clientele
-Clientele resistance decreases as
agency staff communicate the necessity
for procedural compliance and provide
detailed guidance on how to comply

Agncyct Statements
Environmenta
-The quantity and quality of information
in EIS's tends to increase, sometimes
excessively so, while the preparation
of statements continues to remain
separated from the agency's decisionmaking process
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Diagram 1 Continued

Integrated Planning Phase
Agency Leadership
-Increased recognition of positive benefits from environmental assessment
-Endorsement and promotion of improved
integration of environmental assessments into ongoing agency decisionmaking
-Beginning of consideration of environmental values in long-range planning
and policy-making

Intervening Events
-Judicial review of agency procedural
compliance decreases
-Judicial review of the substance of
agency actions is limited to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard

Agency Staff
-Environmental review becomes securely
institutionalized forming a routine
part of agency activity, requiring less
internaloversigt

-Conflicts in Congress between energy
development and environmental programs
limit the extent to which environmental
values are incorporated intonew legislation and program plans

-Field staff attitudes become more
favorable to environmental review
as a 'conseqaence of experience in implementing NEPA

-Efforts are ireinitiated to exempt certain
categories of projects from NEPA,especially those relating to economic and
energy development

-Educational Programs continue to
reinforce learning from experience

-CEQ andEPA increase their efforts to
provide substantive guidance and oversightto agencies

Agency Clientele
-Experience with NEPA implementation
results in increased cooperation and
recognition of positive benefits from
iml enmentation
Envirommenta

pact Statements

-EIS findings are increasingly integrated into agency decisions, often
resulting in incremental changes in
the actions taken
-Environmental considerations are discussed with external interests well in
advance of the preparation of the draft
EIS
-Efforts continue within the agencies
to improve baseline environmental data
and data collection techniques
-Consultants and contract research are
routinely utilized to evaluate impacts
involving matters not within agency
competence

-CEQand EPAcontract research improves
the techniques available for environmental measurement and assessment
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Diagram 1 Continued

Progranmatic Planning Phase
Agency Leadership
-Multi-level EIS's areendorsed by agency
leadership thatapply NEPA to agency
policy-making and planning in addition
to itsapplication to specific projects
Agency Staff
-Internal
environmental review shifts
suustantive qualiLy of staff
to tile
environmental analysis and to the application of NEPAto early agency planning
processes and the generic impact of
agency activities
-Improved techniques for envirosnmental
assessment continue to be implemented
Agency Clientele
-Clientele reassert opposition to major
changes in agency policies premised on
NEPA
Agency
Enviroumental Impact Statements
-EIS findings are integrated into both
project and programmatic planning at
the earliest possible points in time
-The number and length of EIS's decreases as a multi-level approach to
impact analysis is adopted
-EIS's take into account impacts on the
humanas well as physical environment
-Follow-up studies areconducted to ascertain the accuracy of antecedent environmental analyses
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